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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to study what is the best structure of a Board of Directors when
collusive aspects between the Board and the CEO are taken into account. We analyze how
shareholders should select the members of the Board in a framework with asymmetric infor-
mation and uncertainty about the optimal projects for the rm. In particular, we examine the
optimal degree of independence of the Board from a shareholders perspective. This allows us
to state when it is benecial for shareholders to have an insider-oriented board or an outsider
oriented board with a majority of independent directors when collusion is a major threat.
Keywords: Collusion, Corporate Governance, Asymmetric Information, Uncertainty.
JEL Classi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1 Introduction
Collusion between Boards of Directorsmembers and the CEO may be a major problem for the
governance of rms. Indeed, most of the recent corporate scandals in the US or in Europe have
emphasized the importance of corporate governance in the management of rms. For instance, a
signicant proportion of Board members of the Vinci Group in Europe or Worldcom and Home
Depot in the US proved to be ever loyal to their CEO. An example of such a behavior is highlighted
We thank Gilles Chemla, Francesca Cornelli, Mara Faccio, Daniel Ferreira, Urs Peyer, Charu Raheja, Silvia
Rossetto, David Thesmar and participants to the Toulouse Business School Corporate Governance workshop, the
EEA-ESEM 2011 conference in Oslo and to the CASS Business School seminar for helpful comments. All remaining
errors are ours.
1
in The Boston Globe (January 6, 2007): "Despite his failure to increase the value of Home Depots
stock, chief executive o¢ cer Robert Nardelli left the company this week with a $210 million farewell
package, the result of an agreement he negotiated with the board of directors in 2000. Across
America, a culture of collusion between board members and prospective CEOs inates executive
pay and needs to be checked by greater shareholder involvement." Those "collusive" directors (some
of them referred to as the "Bernies Boys" for Worldcom) vote in favor of the CEOs propositions and
allow her to get among others things generous bonuses, severance packages and golden retirement
pensions. In many of those cases of "bad governance," one of the main issues was an explicit or
implicit collusion between Directors of the Board and the CEO.
The aim of this paper is to study what is the best structure of a Board of Directors when
collusive aspects between the Board and the CEO are taken into account. The Sabarnes-Oxley
Act, the NYSE and the NASDAQ regulations in the US request that independent directors play a
more important role in boards of directors. In order to study the e¢ ciency of such requirements,
we examine what should be the optimal degree of independence of a Board of directors from a
shareholders perspective. This allows us to state when it is benecial for shareholders to have an
insider-oriented board or an outsider oriented board with a majority of independent directors when
collusion is a major threat.
In our setting, the CEO has to choose between two projects that di¤er by their level of risk.
The CEOs ability to undertake projects (High or Low) is unknown by the shareholders. The level
of risk of the projects and the CEOs ability are her private information. Selecting a too risky
project while it is not optimal for the rm yields a private benet to the CEO. This private benet
may represent her utility from deriving various advantages such as perks, or building empires. In
order to limit the CEOs discretion, shareholders have the opportunity to select the members of
the Board and thus to choose its degree of independence. The Board has both a supervising and a
consulting job. In our model, the role of the Board is thus to bring information about the type of
the project that has been advised by the CEO but also to monitor the CEO.
We also allow for the possibility of collusion between the board and the CEO. Collusion takes
place through a bribe o¤ered by the CEO to some Directors in order to induce them not to reveal
to shareholders that she has made a bad decision for the rm. Such a bribe may be a monetary
or a non monetary transfer (e.g. future salary increases, perks, insurance to stay in the Board,...).
Consequently, the collection of information from the CEO by shareholders may be more di¢ cult
and more costly because collusion reduces the strengthness of monitoring by directors.
The composition of the board, and in particular his level of independence which is measured
by the proportion of independent directors in the board, inuences the CEOs behavior. Indeed,
lower is this degree of independence, more the Boards information about the type of the project
is precise, but also more the Board is prone to engage in collusion with the CEO, both due to his
2
relationships with the CEO and his executive role in the rm for instance.
This framework allows us to derive the optimal compensation contract of the CEO which consists
of a xed and a variable part. More precisely, our results are the following. First, we consider as
a benchmark the case of no board of directors (or equivalently the case of no CEOs monitoring
by the directors). In this setting, we show that the variable part of the CEOs wage is higher for
a high ability CEO than for a low ability CEO. Then, we allow shareholders to recruit a Board of
Directors in order to monitor the CEO, assuming that collusion cannot emerge. An intesting result
is that the Board behaves as a perfectly honest Board. The contract takes the same form as the one
with no board i.e. no informational rent for a low ability CEO and a positive informational rent for
a high ability CEO. Those informational rents correspond to the surplus a CEO can extract from
the shareholders thanks to her informational advantage. However, informational rents are lower in
this case than when there is no monitoring from the Board. This implies that it it less costly for
shareholders to obtain information from the CEO when the Board monitors him. This enables us to
characterize a threshold wage such that if the Boards wage is lower than this threshold, recruiting
a Board of Directors in order to monitor the CEO is always benecial for the shareholders.
Allowing for the possibility of collusion between the board and the CEO, we show that the
optimal contract is collusion proof: it is optimal for the shareholders to o¤er a contract preventing
collusion to emerge. The optimal contract is designed such that shareholders have to concede to
the CEO the same informational rents as in the presence of a perfectly honest board. However,
they also have to ensure that the coalition Board-CEO does not collude which is costly in terms
of informational rents. We also prove that there exists a degree of independence of the Board
above which it is not protable for the coalition Board-CEO to engage in collusion. In this case,
shareholders do not have to care about preventing collusion when designing the optimal contract.
The Board will therefore behave as a perfectly honest Board.
To our knowledge, our paper is the rst theoretical model to consider the possibility of explicit
collusion between the Board of Directors and the CEO. However, collusion has received a large
attention in the Mechanism Design literature. The seminal paper of Tirole (1986) studies a three-
tier organization with a principal, a supervisor and an agent in a moral hazard framework. In Tirole
(1986), the agent and the supervisor can collude. Tirole (1986) derives the optimal collusion-proof
contract. In our model and in another context with adverse selection, we also tackle this problem
and derive the optimal collusion-proof contract.1 Faure-Grimaud, La¤ont and Martimort (2003)
also study, in an adverse selection model, the optimal design of organization and the value of
delegation when the supervisor and the agent can collude against the principal.
1Our paper di¤ers from Tirole (1986) as we introduce the possibility that the CEO (the agent) chooses between
di¤erent projects of investments and that the possibility of collusion is a¤ected by the composition of the board.
Moreover, we study what would be the optimal supervisor (board of directors) in the context of corporate governance.
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Finally, we also derive the optimal degree of independence of the Board. Contrary to the
usual idea that an optimal Board should be independent, we nd that shareholders may prefer
to select a Board of Directors with a low degree of independence. Indeed, when designing the
optimal structure of the Board, shareholders face a trade-o¤ between the information that they
may extract from the Board and the costs from both extracting it and avoiding collusion. We
then characterize conditions under which the optimal structure is a Board with a low degree of
independence. Those conditions are the following: the risk of both projects have to be close and
the degree of independence necessary to have a perfectly honest Board should be high enough.
However, when project 2 is too risky compared to project 1 or when the degree of independence
necessary to have a perfectly honest Board is low enough, we nd that the optimal structure is a
Board with a high degree of independence. In this case, the shareholders should not care about
collusion because collusion is not protable for such Boards. Indeed, when the level of relative
risks of the two projects is high, it is important to monitor the CEO and prevent him to choose
too a risky and non protable project for the shareholders. In this case, shareholders should choose
a board with a high degree of independence. The problem is less acute when the risks of the two
projects are close.
There is a large literature in corporate governance about the composition of Boards of Directors
(Boone, Field, Karpo¤ and Raheja, 2007, Dahya and McConnell, 2007, Harris and Raviv, 2006,
Linck, Netter and Yang, 2008, Raheja, 2005), the relationship between the Board of Directors
and the CEO (Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 2009, or Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003) as well as
the monitoring role (Cornelli, Kominek and Ljungqvist, 2010, or Harris and Raviv, 2006) and the
advisory role of the boards of directors (Adams and Fereira, 2007). Nevertheless, the problem of
potential collusion between the CEO and the board has received little attention.2
The closest paper is Adams and Ferreira (2007). In their model, there is a continuum of projects
but the projects do not di¤er with their level of risks. The CEO is reluctant from transmitting
information to the Board of Directors because of the Boards monitoring role. The composition of
the board of directors inuences the behavior of the CEO as the more independent is the board of
directors the more the CEO is monitored and the less the CEO is inclined to share information with
the board. We share their result stating that it is not always optimal to choose an independent
board for shareholders. However, the force driving our result is di¤erent from theirs. In Adams and
Ferreira, when the Boards independence level is low, there is a low probability for the CEO to lose
control. This makes revelation of information less costly for him and implies that choosing such a
Board may be optimal for the shareholders. In our article, shareholders choose a non independant
board even though they know that CEOs monitoring will be weakened because of its greater ability
2For reviews of the Corporate Governance literature, see Bebchuk and Weisbach (2010), Adams, Hermalin and
Weisbach (2010), Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) or Tirole (2001).
4
to collect information which allows them to make a better investment decision. Moreover, in their
paper, they do not explicitly model collusion between the CEO and the board members.
Raheja (2006) studies the question of the optimal composition and the ideal size of Boards
of Directors. In the model, the optimal board structure is determined by the trade-o¤ between
insidersincentives to reveal their private information and the outsiderscosts to verify projects.
We also derive the optimal composition of the board taking into account the collusive behavior of
CEO and directors.
Another interesting question raised by this literature is the potential replacement of the CEO
by the board of directors. Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) analyze the role of independent directors
in boards and show that a bad CEO is more likely to be replaced when the board is independent.
Independent directors are therefore a mean for controlling the performance of the rm and a threat
for bad CEOs. Hermalin (2007) studies the decision of hiring an internal vs an external CEO. Less
is known about the external CEO. The model he develops determines whether it is optimal to keep
an existing CEO or to replace him at a certain cost. While we do not address the question of the
replacement of the CEO, monitoring of the CEO by the directors may entail a high ne for him
which may be interpreted as his dismissal.
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 analyzes the
benchmark case of no board of directors while section 4 introduces monitoring of the CEO by the
board. Section 5 studies the impact of collusion on our results. The optimal structure of the board
is discussed in section 6. Finally, section 7 o¤ers conclusions.
2 The Model
2.1 The CEO and the Projects of the Company
A rm can undertake a project which yields an uncertain payo¤. The rm is run for the shareholders
by a CEO, i.e. the CEOs task is to select the project that will be undertaken by the rm.
The CEOs ability to succeed in the projects may be either low,  = ; with probability ()
or high,  =  with probability (1  ): As  corresponds to a low CEOs ability and  to a high
ability, we have    .
We assume that the rm can undertake two kinds of projects that di¤er with their level of
risk. The implementation of those projects initially require a xed investment I by the rms
shareholders. The characteristics of those projects are the following:
 Project 1 either succeeds, that is, yields veriable income R > 0 or fails, that is, yields no
income. The probability of success is denoted by (q1): Moreover, this project may have a low
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probability of success, that is, q1 =pi with probability () or may have a high probability of
success q1 = pi with probability (1   ) where i 2

;
	
is the CEOs ability to succeed
in the projects.
 In the same way, Project 2 either succeeds, that is, yields veriable income R > 0 or fails,
that is, yields no income. The probability of success is denoted by (q2): Moreover, this project
may have a low probability of success, that is, q2 = (p   ")i with probability () or may
have a high probability of success q2 = (p+ ")i with probability (1  ) where i 2

;
	
is the CEOs ability to succeed in the projects.
The success and the failure of both projects are assumed to be perfectly correlated i.e. ()
represents the probability that the economic context is bad for the type of projects considered by
the rm while (") represents the relative volatility of project two compared to project one.
As the Net Present Value of the riskiest project has to be at least higher than the NPV of the
other project, we should have: 
(p  ")i + (1  ) (p+ ")i

R  I   pi + (1  ) piR  I:
This is equivalent to:
  1
2
:
The CEO perfectly knows both her abilitys type and the probability of success of the projects
while shareholders only know their prior probability distributions.
The CEO may therefore send signals to shareholders about her type and the project she advises
to select: 8>>>>><>>>>>:
1;1 = ( = ;Project 1) ) q2 = p  " and q1 = p
1;2 = ( = ;Project 2) ) q2 = p+ " and q1 = p
2;1 = ( = ;Project 1) ) q2 = p  " and q1 = p
2;2 = ( = ;Project 2) ) q2 = p+ " and q1 = p
The CEOs compensation (paid by the rms shareholders) is composed by a xed part i;j and
a variable part i;j that depends on the prots from the project () where i 2 f1; 2g corresponds to
the CEOs signal about her ability (called hereafter the CEOs type) and j 2 f1; 2g corresponds to
the CEOs signal about the probability of success of the project (called hereafter the best projects
type).
When Project 2 is selected while it has a low probability of success q2 = (p   "), the CEO
receives a private benet B which represents his private compensation for choosing a project that
poorly performs. In this state of nature, the CEO should rationally choose Project 1 but this
private benet may induce him to misbehave.
The CEOs reservation wage is w.
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2.2 The Board of Directors
Shareholders also have the opportunity to hire a Board. The Board has both a supervising and
a consulting job, i.e. the Board may have information about the type of the project and can
communicate it to shareholders but may also monitor the information communicated by the CEO.
The structure of the Board is endogenous, in the sense that shareholders design it. Shareholders
can choose the degree of independence of the Board. Lower is this degree of independence, more
the Boards information about the type of the project is precise, but also more the Board is prone
to engage in collusion with the CEO, both due to his relationships with the CEO and his executive
role in the rm for instance.
We model the degree of independence of the board by a variable  2 [min;+1]; with min  1;
that acts as a discount factor for the collusions rents. When his degree of independence,  ;
increases, the amount of information hold by a Board decreases while his willingness to engage in
collusion decreases.  can also be interpreted as the degree of toughness and enforceability of the
laws against collusion. Tougher are those laws, more di¢ cult it is for the coalition Board-CEO to
engage in collusion.
Let () = 1 be the probability that a Board with a degree of independence  has gathered
the true information about the economic context for the type of projects considered by the rm.
When  increases, Board members are more independent and less prone to collusion. However,
as they have less information about the rm, their probability of knowing the truth is lower. We
also assume that the CEO incurs a ne F when the Board reveals to the shareholders that she
has announced that the project has a high probability of success while it is a project with a low
probability of success, i.e. the case in which she gets the bonus B.
We are particularly interested in determining the value of the degree of independence  such
that the Board is Independent i.e. is completely honest and never accepts to engage in collusion
with the CEO (this however means that he has a less precise information about the type of the
project).
When collusion takes place, we assume that the CEO shares the collusive prots with the Board.
As it is usually the case in practice, the Boards wage is the total amount of the directorsfees
which is constant and equals to w0.
2.3 Multidimensional Screening Model
This model is a multidimensional screening model. Solving this kind of model is usually very
complex (see Rochet and Chone, 1998). However, the structure of the model allows us to reduce
this problems complexity. Indeed, as the CEOs program can be specied as a function of only one
parameter, i;j , we can rewrite the model as a usual four types unidimensional screening model. In
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this case, i;j is dened in the following way:8>>>>><>>>>>:
1;1 = p
1;2 = (p+ ")
2;1 = p
2;2 = (p+ ")
Moreover, we assume that
 
p  "  (p+ "); i.e. a high ability CEO undertaking a project
with a low probability of success is more likely to succeed than a low ability CEO undertaking a
project with a high probability of success. This assumption highlights the positive role of the CEO
in her management of projects.
Denote the rms prots j (i;j) = i;jR I: The shareholders maximize their expected prots:
W = 
 
1  1;1

1 (1;1)  1;1

+ (1  )  1  1;22 (1;2)  1;2
+(1  )  1  2;11 (2;1)  2;1+ (1  )(1  )  1  2;22 (2;2)  2;2
3 No Board
When they do not hire a Board of Directors, shareholders maximize their expected prots under
the usual Participation and Incentive constraints. PCij is the Participation constraint of a CEO
with ability i 2 f1; 2g when the project is of type j 2 f1; 2g. The Participation constraints ensure
that the CEO will earn at least her reservation wage w. ICij!kl is the Incentive constraint of a
CEO who reveals that her ability is k 2 f1; 2g and the project is of type l 2 f1; 2g while her true
ability is i and the true type of the best project is j. The Incentives constraints ensure that the
CEO earns a higher wage revealing the truth than lying to the shareholders. Through this process,
shareholders induce the CEO to reveal her true type. Those constraints are stated here:
i;j + i;j
j (i;j)  w (PCij)
HH + HH (HH)  HL + HL

pR  I (ICHH!HL)
HH + HH

(p+ ")R  I  LH + LH (p+ ")R  I (ICHH!LH)
HH + HH

(p+ ")R  I  LL + LL pR  I (ICHH!LL)
HL + HL

pR  I  HH + HH  p  "R  I+B (ICHL!HH)
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HL + HL

pR  I  LH + LH  p  "R  I+B (ICHL!LH)
HL + HL

pR  I  LL + LL pR  I (ICHL!LL)
LH + LH

(p+ ")R  I  HH + HH (p+ ")R  I (ICLH!HH)
LH + LH

(p+ ")R  I  HL + HL pR  I (ICLH!HL)
LH + LH

(p+ ")R  I  LL + LL pR  I (ICLH!LL)
LL + LL

pR  I  HH + HH  p  "R  I+B (ICLL!HH)
LL + LL

pR  I  HL + HL pR  I (ICLL!HL)
LL + LL

pR  I  LH + LH  p  "R  I+B (ICLL!LH)
Moreover, the Spence Mirrlees condition has to be satised, that is:
HH  HL  LH  LL
By assumption, we know that the following condition is satised: 
p  "   (p+ ")  0 (1)
As usual in this kind of problem, the binding constraints are3:
LL + LL

pR  I = w (PCLL)
LH + LH

(p+ ")R  I = LL + LL pR  I (ICLH!LL)
= LL + LL

pR  I+ LLRp
= w + LLRp
3We check that all constraints are satised in the Appendix.
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HL + HL

pR  I = LH + LH  p  "R  I+B (ICHL!LH)
= LH + LH

(p+ ")R  I  LHR (p+ ")    p  "+B
= w + LLRp+ LHR

p   p   "   + +B
HH + HH

(p+ ")R  I = HL + HL pR  I (ICHH!HL)
= HL + HL

pR  I+ HLRp
= w + LLRp+ LHR

p   p   "   + + HLRp+B
Then we can characterize the optimal contract when there is no Board in the rms organization.
This is stated in the following Proposition:
Proposition 1 When they do not hire a Board of Directors, shareholders must concede the follow-
ing informational rents to a CEO
ULL = w
ULH = w
UHL = w +
B
 
p  "
 [p+ 2"]
UHH =
8><>:
w +
B(p ")p()2
[p+2"][p p] if "  "nb =
p
+
p
p
 
w + B(p+")[p+2"] if "  "nb
Moreover, the shareholdersexpected prots are
WNB =
8><>: E()  w  
(1 )B(p ")
(p+2")

 p+p
p p

if "  "nb
E()  w   (1  ) (p+ "  p  2") B(p+2") if "  "nb
A low ability CEO does not receive any rent whatever the type of project she advises to select.
However, when her signal pushes shareholders to select the project with the highest volatility
(Project 2), she receives a variable wage while she only gets a xed wage when shareholders are
induced to select Project 1.
A high ability CEO receives an informational rent which is higher when her signal induces
shareholders to select the project with the highest volatility (Project 2) than when shareholders
are induced to select Project 1. Moreover, the variable part of her wage is higher when project 2 is
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nally selected than when it is Project 1. But, in all cases, the variable part of a high ability CEO
is higher that the one of a low ability CEO.
4 No Collusion
In this section, we assume that collusion is not possible between the Board of Directors and the
CEO4.When shareholders hire a Board, the CEO may incur a loss F when the Board has found that
she has announced that the Project has a high probability of success while it is a low probability
of success project, i.e. the case in which she has the bonus B. The Participation and Incentive
constraints are now:
ij + ijij  w (PCij)
HH + HH

(p+ ")R  I  HL + HL pR  I (ICHH!HL)
HH + HH

(p+ ")R  I  LH + LH (p+ ")R  I (ICHH!LH)
HH + HH

(p+ ")R  I  LL + LL pR  I (ICHH!LL)
HL + HL

pR  I  (1  ())HH + HH  p  "R  I+B	+ () (w   F )
(ICHL!HH)
HL + HL

pR  I  (1  ())LH + LH  p  "R  I+B	+ () (w   F )
(ICHL!LH)
HL + HL

pR  I  LL + LL pR  I (ICHL!LL)
LH + LH

(p+ ")R  I  HH + HH (p+ ")R  I (ICLH!HH)
LH + LH

(p+ ")R  I  HL + HL pR  I (ICLH!HL)
4We examine the case of collusion in the next section.
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LH + LH

(p+ ")R  I  LL + LL pR  I (ICLH!LL)
LL + LL

pR  I  (1  ())HH + HH  p  "R  I+B	+ () (w   F )
(ICLL!HH)
LL + LL

pR  I  HL + HL pR  I (ICLL!HL)
LL+LL

pR  I  (1  ())LH + LH  p  "R  I+B	+() (w   F ) (ICLL!LH)
We also assume that the CEO faces a limited liability constraint, i.e., even if the Board found
that the CEO has sent the wrong signal, she cannot get less than her reservation wage plus a
xed amount, K representing for instance the minimal compensation written in the CEOs labor
contract. This gives:
(1  ()) fw +Bg+ () (w   F )  w +K (LL)
, B  ()
(1  ())F +K
The binding constraints are:
LL + LL

pR  I = w (PCLL)
LH + LH

(p+ ")R  I = LL + LL pR  I (ICLH!LL)
= LL + LL

pR  I+ LLRp
= w + LLRp
HL + HL

pR  I = (1  ())LH + LH  p  "R  I+B	+ () (w   F ) (ICHL!LH)
= (1  ())
(
LH + LH

(p+ ")R  I
 LHR

(p+ ")    p  "+B
)
+ () (w   F )
= (1  ())w + LLRp+ LHR p   p   "   + +B	+ () (w   F )
HH + HH

(p+ ")R  I = HL + HL pR  I (ICHH!HL)
= HL + HL

pR  I+ HLRp
= (1  ())w + LLRp+ LHR p   p   "   + +B	
+() (w   F ) + HLRp
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The optimal contract when there is a Board of Directors and when collusion is not achievable
is characterized in the following Proposition:
Proposition 2 When they hire a Board of Directors and when collusion is not possible, sharehold-
ers must concede the following informational rents to a CEO
ULL = w
ULH = w
UHL = w + (1  ())
 
p  "
0@
h
B   ()(1 ())F
i


(p+ ")   p  "
1A
UHH =
8><>:
w +
(p ")p()2[(1 ())B ()F ]
[p+2"][p p] if "  "ib =
p ()p
(1 ())+ p
p
 
w +
(p+")
h
B  ()
(1 ())F
i
[(p+") (p ")] if "  "ib
Moreover, the shareholdersexpected prots are
WIB =
8>><>>:
E()  w   w0   (1  )(1  ())(p  ")
h
B  ()
(1 ())F
i
(p+2")

 + (1  ) p
p p

if "  "ib
E()  w   w0   (1  )
h
B  ()
(1 ())F
i
(p+2")

(1  ())(p  ") + (1  )(p+ ") if "  "ib
In this case, the optimal contract has the same form than without Board, i.e. no rent for a low
ability CEO and a positive rent for a high ability CEO which is higher when Project 2 is selected
following her advice. However, we can note that the informational rents extracted by a CEO when
there is a Board of Directors having no possibility to collude are lower than when there is no Board
whatever the CEOs type.
We can therefore immediately conclude that if the Boards wage is low enough, hiring an a
Board is always benecial for the shareholders when collusion is not possible, i.e. WIB WNB for
all w0  fw0:
Corollary 3 There exists a Boards wage fw0 such that for all w0  fw0; hiring an a Board is always
benecial for the shareholders when collusion is not possible
5 Collusive Board
We now examine a framework in which the CEO and the Board of Directors may collude when this
is protable for them.
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In the following inequalities, wL is the income of a board that announces that the project has
a low probability of success, wH is the income of a board that announces that the project has a
high probability of success, w; is the income of a board that announces that it has no information
regarding the project probability of success, w0 is the income of a board when collusion cannot
emerge as in the previous section.
The following constraints ensure that the CEO-Board coalition get more when telling the truth
than colluding.
 [ULL   w + wL] + (1  ) [UHL   w + wL]  

ULH   w

+ w;

+ (1  )

UHH   w

+ w;

, wL  

ULH   w

  (ULL   w)

+ (1  )

UHH   w

  (UHL   w)

+ w;
 [ULH   w + wH ] + (1  ) [UHH   w + wH ]  

ULL   w

+ w;

+ (1  )

UHL   w

+ w;

, wH  

ULL   w

  (ULH   w)

+ (1  )

UHL   w

  (UHH   w)

+ w;
Since we have ULL  ULH  UHL  UHH and   min  1, necessarily


ULH   w

  (ULL   w)

+ (1  )

UHH   w

  (UHL   w)

 0
.
We then have 4 constraints to satisfy:
wL  

ULH   w

  (ULL   w)

+ (1  )

UHH   w

  (UHL   w)

+ w; (1)
wH  

ULH   w

  (ULL   w)

+ (1  )

UHH   w

  (UHL   w)

+ w; (2)
wL  w0 (3)
wH  w0 (4)
In the following, we will examine when it is in the shareholders interest to avoid collusion
between the Board and the CEO. Indeed, avoiding collusion is costly because shareholders have to
pay higher wages to the Board in order to induce him to reveal the gathered information. If those
informational rents are too high, it may therefore be optimal for the Board to let collusion happen.
5.1 Collusion-Proof contract
We rst analyze a situation in which shareholders want to ensure that collusion in the Board is
avoided. The only case they have to take into account is when the Board tells that there is a low
14
probability of success (the Board is more likely to lie when the project is of a low probability of
success; there is no point in lying when it is of a high probability of success). We therefore always
have wL  wH . Shareholders can try to use wL to pay the Board into revealing the truth: if
they set wL high enough, collusion might be avoided. The shareholdersexpected prots have the
following form:
WCP = E()  ULL    (1  )ULH   (1  ) UHL   (1  ) (1  )UHH
 ()wL   (1  ) ()wH   (1  ())w0
In that case, the constraint on wL is binding. Since they want to maximize their income,
shareholders set wH = w; = w0 (because w0 is the lowest wage of the board).
wL = 

ULH   w

  (ULL   w)

+ (1  )

UHH   w

  (UHL   w)

+ w;
= 

ULH   ULL

+
1  

(ULL   w)

+ (1  )

UHH   UHL

+
1  

(UHL   w)

+ w;
wH = w; = w0
We can remark that there exists 0 such that wL  w0 ()   0: This means that for   0,
engaging in collusion is not benecial for the coalition Board-CEO and the optimal contract is the
same as with an Independent Board. Actually, when   0, the Board will not collude whatsoever
happens. Shareholders dont need to induce the Board to say the truth because he will do it anyway.
So, we have in this case
wL = wH = w0
We are now characterizing 0
wL  w0 ()  [ (ULL   w) + (1  ) (UHL   w)]   (ULH   w) + (1  ) (UHH   w)
()   UHH   w
UHL   w =
8<:
1
1 (0)
p+"
p " if "  "ib
p
p p if "  "ib
And then, as () = 1 :
0 =
8<: 1 +
p+"
p " if "  "ib
p
p p if "  "ib
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However, on the interval [min; 0], since shareholders have paid enough to avoid collusion, the
CEOs rents are those of an Independent Board. For those degree of independence, since sharehold-
ers have paid enough to avoid collusion, the CEOs rents are those of an Independent Board:
ULL = w
ULH = w
UHL = w + (1  ())
 
p  "
0@
h
B   ()(1 ())F
i


(p+ ")   p  "
1A
UHH =
8><>:
w +
(p ")p()2[(1 ())B ()F ]
[p+2"][p p] if "  "ib
w +
(p+")
h
B  ()
(1 ())F
i
[(p+") (p ")] if "  "ib
This is stated in the following Proposition.
Proposition 4 Assume that collusion between the Board of Directors and the CEO is possible.
 In the optimal collusion proof contract, when they hire a Board of Directors, shareholders
must concede the same rents to a CEO as in the presence of an Independent Board. In this
case, the shareholdersexpected prots are
WCP =
8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
E()  w   w0
 (1  )(1  ())(p  ")
h
B  ()
(1 ())F
i
(p+2")
24 (1  ())
+(1   + () ) pp p
35 if "  "ib
E()  w   w0   (1  )
h
B  ()
(1 ())F
i
(p+2")
"
(1  ())2(p  ")
+(1   + () )(p+ ")
#
if "  "ib
 Moreover, there exists 0 such that for Boards of Directors with a degree of independence
  0, it is not benecial to engage in collusion.
The second part of this Proposition means that from some degree of independence for the Board,
it is so di¢ cult for the coalition Board-CEO to engage in collusion that they prefer not to collude
without any sharholdersintervention. For such Boards, the shareholders should therefore not care
about collusion.
5.2 Collusion Free contract
We now characterize the optimal collusion free contract. In this case, shareholders would have to
pay too much to avoid collusion. They therefore decide to let it happen because avoiding collusion
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will be too costly for them in terms of informational rents paid to the Board. The shareholders
expected prots have the following form:
WCF = E()  ULL    (1  )ULH   (1  ) UHL   (1  ) (1  )UHH
 ()wL   (1  ) ()wH   (1  ())w;
This is optimal to set wL = w0. Inequalities (1) and (2) do not need to be satised. Subsequently,
we have:
wL = wH = w; = w0
Since the Board is collusive, shareholders should not trust what it says for their own good.
Therefore, the CEOs rents are those of a No Board case.
ULL = w
ULH = w
UHL = w +
B
 
p  "
 [p+ 2"]
UHH =
8<: w +
B(p ")p()2
[p+2"][p p] if "  "nb
w + B(p+")[p+2"] if "  "nb
Proposition 5 Assume that collusion between the Board of Directors and the CEO is possible. In
the optimal collusion free contract, when they hire a Board of Directors, shareholders must concede
the same rents to a CEO as without any Board.
In this case, the shareholdersexpected prots are
WCF =
8><>: E()  w0   w   (1  )

 + (1  ) p
p p

B(p ")
(p+2") if "  "nb
E()  w0   w   (1  ) [(p+ ")  (p+ 2")] B(p+2") if "  "nb
5.3 Optimal Contract with collusion
We will now use the specied form for the probability that a Board with a degree of independence
 has gathered the true information about the economic context for the type of projects considered
by the rm, i.e. () = 1 .
In order to nd the optimal contract in presence of collusion, WCB; we have to compare WCP
and WCF and to nd which one is the highest depending on  . Indeed, the shareholders will choose
to design the contract (Collusion Proof or Collusion Free) in order to maximize their objective. As
"ib  "nb we only have three cases:
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1. "  "ib
2. "ib  "  "nb
3. "nb  "
The following Proposition characterizes the optimal contract when collusion is achievable.
Proposition 6 For all  2 [min; 0] ; the optimal contract is the collusion proof contract for all ".
This allows us to state that the shareholderss welfare, WCB that depends on  is, for all
 2 [min; 0] :
WCB() = max(WCP ;WCF ) =WCP ()
This is an important result as it means that when collusion is achievable and is protable for the
coalition Board/CEO, it is benecial for the shareholders to o¤er a contract preventing collusion
to emerge. However, this is costly in terms of informational rents.
This result and those of the previous sections allow us to characterize what is the optimal
structure of the Board of Directors from the shareholdersperspective.
6 Optimal Structure of the Board
We are now able to nd what is the optimal Boards degree of independence  maximizing the
piecewise continuous shareholderss welfare WCB():
We have to take care about corner solutions as  2 [1; 0] :
In order to simplify the computations, we rewrite the intervals of discontinuity of WCB() in
order to build them with respect to  : This gives
"  "ib =
pp  1 pp
( 1)
 p+ p   p
,  
p
[p p]
p
[p p]  
(p+")
(p ")
= b
Hence, when b  0 or  p[p p]   (p+")(p ")

 0; () "  pp
p+[p p] = b";
"  "ib for all 
and when b  0 and  p[p p]   (p+")(p ")

 0; () "  pp
p+[p p] = b";
"  "ib for   b ; and
"  "ib for   b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The shareholders thus have the following objective function5:
When "  b" and b  0
WCB() =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
E()  w   w0
 (1  ) [B 
1
 1F ]
(p+2")
"
(  1 )
2(p  ")
+(1   + 
2
)(p+ ")
#
if   b
E()  w   w0
 (1  )(  1 )(p  ")
[B  1 1F ]
(p+2")
24 (  1 )
+(1   + 
2
) p
p p
35 if b    0
E()  w   w0
 (1  )(  1 )(p  ")
[B  1 1F ]
(p+2")

 + (1  ) p
p p

if   0
When "  b"; or b  0
WCB() =
8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
E()  w   w0
 (1  ) [B 
1
 1F ]
(p+2")
"
(  1 )
2(p  ")
+(1   + 
2
)(p+ ")
#
if   0
E()  w   w0
 (1  ) [B 
1
 1F ]
(p+2")

(  1 )(p  ") + (1  )(p+ ")

if   0
Recall that shareholders set the penalty F as high as possible, i.e. such that
h
B   1 1F
i
= K:
The following Proposition summarizes our results:
Proposition 7 When "  b"; and 0  b ; it is optimal for the shareholders to select a Board of
Directors with a low degree of independence, i.e.  = b and to o¤er contracts avoiding collusion
between the Board and the CEO.
In all other cases, it is optimal for the shareholders to select a Board of Directors with a high
degree of independence, i.e.  = 0. In this case, the shareholders should not care about collusion
because collusion is not protable for such Boards.
Contrary to the usual idea that the optimal Board should be independent, we nd that share-
holders may prefer to select a Board of Directors with a low degree of independence. However, the
result is not due, as in Adams and Ferreira (2007), to the fact that the CEO is more prone to reveal
information to a "friendly" Board.
Here, there is a trade-o¤ between the information that shareholders may extract from the
Board and the costs from both extracting it and avoiding collusion. Remind that the degree of
5As b  0 8"
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independence of the Board,  ; can also be interpreted as the degree of toughness and enforceability
of the laws against collusion. Higher is  , more di¢ cult it is for the coalition Board-CEO to engage
in collusion, but less they have information about the projects.
In other words, the optimal structure is a Board with a low degree of independence when:
 the risk of both projects are close, i.e. the projects among which the rm has to choose have
similar level of risks, and
 the degree of independence necessary to have a perfectly honest Board is too high, i.e. the
loss of information about the projects that would be associated to the choice of a perfectly
honest Board would be too important.
The intuition for this result is the following. Shareholders should not care about hiring an
independent Board when it is too costly to do so and when potential collusion between the CEO
and the Board has not a big impact on the rms decision which is the case when the projects are
similar in terms of risk and the degree of independence necessary to have a perfectly honest Board is
too high. Indeed, collusion allows the CEO to undertake projects with a level of risk that is higher
than what would be optimal for shareholders. This means that closer are the risk of projects, lower
are the costs of collusion. As hiring an more independent board leads to extract less information
and as it would be too costly to choose a perfectly honest board (because 0 is high), choosing a
board with a low degree of independence is therefore optimal.
However, in all other cases, i.e. when project 2 is much more risky than project 1 or when
he degree of independence necessary to have a perfectly honest Board is low enough, it is optimal
for shareholders to choose a Board with a high degree of independence. The optimal structure is
therefore a perfectly hosnest Board and the shareholders should not care about collusion because
collusion is not protable for such Boards.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we shed light on the e¤ect of collusion between a board of directors and a CEO. To
the best of our knowledge this is the rst paper to study formally collusion in this context.
In our paper, we have shown that when there is no board of directors (or equivalently the
case of no CEOs monitoring by the directors) the variable part of the wage is higher for a high
ability CEO than for a low ability CEO. When we assume that shareholders can recruit a Board of
Directors in order to monitor the CEO but that collusion cannot emerge, the Board behaves as a
perfectly honest Board. Allowing for the possibility of collusion between the board and the CEO,
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we show that the optimal contract is collusion proof: it is optimal for the shareholders to o¤er a
contract preventing collusion to emerge. We also prove that there exists a degree of independence
of the Board above which it is not protable for the coalition Board-CEO to engage in collusion.
Finally, we also derive the optimal degree of independence of the Board. Contrary to the usual
idea that an optimal Board should be independent, we nd that shareholders may prefer to select
a Board of Directors with a low degree of independence.
8 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. When they do not hire a Board of Directors, shareholders maximize
their expected prots under the usual Participation and Incentive constraints. PCij is the Partic-
ipation constraint of a CEO with ability i 2 fH;Lg when the project is of type j 2 fH;Lg. The
Participation constraints ensure that the CEO will earn at least her reservation wage w. ICij!kl
is the Incentive constraint of a CEO who reveals that her ability is k 2 fH;Lg and the project is
of type l 2 fH;Lg while her true ability is i and the true type of the project is j. The Incentives
constraints ensure that the CEO earns a higher wage revealing the truth than lying to the share-
holders. Through this process, shareholders induce the CEO to reveal his real type. As usual in
this kind of problem, the binding constraints are :
LL + LL

pR  I = w (PCLL)
LH + LH

(p+ ")R  I = w + LLRp
HL + HL

pR  I = w + LLRp+ LHR p   p   "   + +B
HH + HH

(p+ ")R  I = w + LLRp+ LHR p   p   "   + + HLRp+B
In order to minimize the CEOs informational rents, shareholders set LL; LH and HL as low as
possible while satisfying the other Incentive constraints. We now check what are the conditions due
to the other Incentive constraints (and will check later that Participation constraints are satised).
There is no constraint on LL; we can therefore set:
LL = 0
LL + LL

pR  I  LH + LH  p  "R  I+B = (ICLL!LH)
LH + LH

(p+ ")R  I  LHR (p+ ")   p  "+B
, LH 
B
R [p+ 2"]
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and then
LH =
B
R [p+ 2"]
HH + HH

(p+ ")R  I  LL + LL pR  I = w + LLR p   p (ICHH!LL)
, w + LLRp+ LHR

p   p   "   + + HLRp+B  w + LLR p   p
, LHR

p   p   "   + + HLRp+B  0
which is satised, as

p   p   "   +   0:
HL + HL

pR  I  LL + LL pR  I = w + LLRp (ICHL!LL)
, w + LLRp+ LHR

p   p   "   + +B  w + LLRp
, LHR

p   p   "   + +B  0
As

p   p   "   +   0; (ICHL!LL) is not binding.
LH + LH

(p+ ")R  I  HH + HH (p+ ")R  I (ICLH!HH)
= HH + HH

(p+ ")R  I  HHR (p+ ")
, w + LLRp  w + LLRp+ LHR

p   p   "   + 
+HLRp+B   HHR (p+ ")
, HH 
B
R [p+ 2"]
= LH :
This is satised from the Spence Mirlees condition.
LH + LH

(p+ ")R  I  HL + HL pR  I = HL + HL pR  I  HLR p   p
(ICLH!HL)
, w + LLRp  w + LLRp+ LHR

p   p   "   +   HLR p   p+B
, HL 
B

p  "
R [p+ 2"]

p   p = 1HL
HH + HH

(p+ ")R  I  LH + LH (p+ ")R  I = w + LLRp+ LHR (p+ ")
(ICHH!LH)
, w + LLRp+ LHR

p   p   "   + + HLRp+B  w + LLRp+ LHR (p+ ")
, HL 
B
Rp
= 2HL
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LL + LL

pR  I  HL + HL pR  I = HL + HL pR  I  HLRp
(ICLL!HL)
, w  w + LLRp+ LHR

p   p   "   +   HLRp +B
HL 
B
 
p  "
Rp [p+ 2"]
This is always veried as
B(p ")
R[p+2"]p  LH and due to the Spence Mirlees condition.
LL + LL

pR  I  LH + LH  p  "R  I+B = (ICLL!LH)
LH + LH

(p+ ")R  I  LHR (p+ ")   p  "+B
, w  w + LLRp  LHR [p+ 2"] +B
(ICLL!LH) is thus not binding.
HL + HL

pR  I  HH + HH  p  "R  I+B (ICHL!HH)
= w + LLRp+ LHR

p   p   "   + + HLRp  HHR [p+ 2"] + 2B
, HH 
B

p  "
R [p+ 2"]2

p   pp+ BR [p+ 2"] = 1HH
LL + LL

pR  I  HH + HH  p  "R  I+B = (ICLL!HH)
HH + HH

(p+ ")R  I  HHR (p+ ")    p  "+B
, HH 
LH
[p p "(+)]
[(p p)+"(+)]
+HL
p
[(p p)+"(+)]
+ 2B
R[(p p)+"(+)]
= 2HH
We therefore have:
LL = 0
LH =
B
R [p+ 2"]
HL = max

LH ;
1
HL;
2
HL
	
HH  max

HL;
1
HH ;
2
HH
	
We now have to show that HL =
8><>:
1HL if " 
p
+
p
p
  = "nb
2HL if " 
p
+
p
p
  = "nb
We only have six cases:
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1. LH  1HL  2HL () HL = 2HL if "  p  "
h
 +
p
p   
i
: Indeed, we have :
LH  1HL  2HL ()
1
p+ 2"

 
p  "
(p+ 2")
 
p   p  p
()
(
p   p   p  " 
p  "p  (p+ 2")  p   p
()
8<: "  pp  " +  pp   
For the following cases (2, 3 and 4), we use the same inequalities to obtain.
2. 1HL  LH  2HL () HL = 2HL if p  "
3. LH  2HL  1HL () HL = 1HL if "
h
 +
p
p   
i
 p  2"
4. 2HL  LH  1HL () HL = 1HL if p  2"
5. 2HL  1HL  LH () impossible. Indeed, we would eventually obtain
"  p  "

 + 
p
p
  

which is not possible because the last term is strictly superior to the rst one.
6. 1HL  2HL  LH () impossible
We therefore have the result of the lemma.
And then :
ULL = LL + LL

pR  I = w
ULH = LH + LH

(p+ ")R  I = w + LLRp = w
UHL = HL + HL

pR  I = w + B p   p   "   + 
 [p+ 2"]
+B
() UHL = w +
B
 
p  "
 [p+ 2"]
Moreover, when "  p
+
p
p
  = "nb
UHH = HH + HH

(p+ ")R  I = w + B  p  "
 [p+ 2"]
+
B

p  "p
 [p+ 2"]

p   p
() UHH = w +
B
 
p  " p ()2
 [p+ 2"]

p   p
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Moreover, when "  p
+
p
p
  = "nb
UHH = HH + HH

(p+ ")R  I = w + B  p  "
 [p+ 2"]
+
B

() UHH = w + B (p+ ")
 [p+ 2"]
To sum up, here are the CEOinformational rents when there is No Board:
ULL = w
ULH = w
UHL = w +
B
 
p  "
 [p+ 2"]
UHH =
8<: w +
B(p ")p()2
[p+2"][p p] if "  "nb
w + B(p+")[p+2"] if "  "nb
We can verify now that we have
ULL  ULH  UHL  UHH
When "  "nb, we need to see if pp p  1, which is true since p p = p p. Subsequently,
we have UHL  UHH . When "  "nb, since p  "  p+ ", we also have UHL  UHH .
Rewriting the shareholdersexpected prots depending on those informational rents, when there is
no board, we have:
WNB = E()  ULL    (1  )ULH   (1  ) UHL   (1  ) (1  )UHH
This gives, for "  p
+
p
p
  = "nb
WNB = E()  w  
(1  )B  p  "
 (p+ 2")
"
 p+ p
p   p
#
And for "  p
+
p
p
  = "nb
WNB = E()  w   (1  ) (p+ "  p  2") B
 (p+ 2")
Proof of Proposition 2. The binding constraints are:
LL + LL

pR  I = w (PCLL)
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LH + LH

(p+ ")R  I = w + LLRp
HL+HL

pR  I = (1  ())w + LLRp+ LHR p   p   "   + +B	+() (w   F )
HH + HH

(p+ ")R  I = (1  ())w + LLRp+ LHR p   p   "   + +B	
+() (w   F ) + HLRp
Again, in order to minimize the informational rents, shareholders will set LL; LH and HL as low
as possible while satisfying the other incentive constraints. We now check what are the conditions
due to the other Incentive constraints (and will check later that Participation constraints are
satised).
LL = 0
HH + HH

(p+ ")R  I  LL + LL pR  I (ICHH!LL)
= w + LLR

p   p = w
LL + LL

pR  I  (1  ())LH + LH  p  "R  I+B	+ () (w   F ) =
(ICLL!LH)
(1  ())
(
w + LLRp
 LHR

(p+ ")   p  "+B
)
+ () (w   F )
, LH 
B   ()(1 ())F
R

(p+ ")   p  "
As ()(1 ())F  B  0; we have
LH =
B   ()(1 ())F
R

(p+ ")   p  "
HL + HL

pR  I  LL + LL pR  I = w + LLRp (ICHL!LL)
, (1  ())
(
LLRp
+LHR

p   p   "   + +B
)
  ()F  LLRp
, LH 
()
(1 ())F  B
R

p   p   "   + 
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As ()(1 ())F  B  0; this is satised
HH + HH

(p+ ")R  I  LH + LH (p+ ")R  I = w + LLRp+ LHR (p+ ")
(ICHH!LH)
,
8>><>>:
(1  ())
(
w + LLRp
+LHR

p   p   "   + +B
)
+() (w   F ) + HLRp
9>>=>>;  w + LLRp+ LHR (p+ ")
HL 
(p+ ")   (1  ())  p  "
p
0@
h
B   ()(1 ())F
i
R

(p+ ")   p  "
1A
, HL  LH

(p+ ")  (1  ())  p  "
p
= 1HL
LH + LH

(p+ ")R  I  HL + HL pR  I (ICLH!HL)
= HL + HL

pR  I  HLR p   p
, w + LLRp 
8>><>>:
(1  ())
(
w + LLRp
+LHR

p   p   "   + +B
)
+() (w   F )  HLR

p   p
9>>=>>;
HL 
(1  ())  p  "
p   p LH = 2HL
We can verify that
HL =
8><>:
1HL if " 
p ()p
(1 ())+ p
p
  = "ib
2HL if " 
p ()p
(1 ())+ p
p
  = "ib
Indeed, we have :
HL = 
1
HL () 1HL  2HL
()

p+ 2"+ ()
 
p  "
p
 (1  ())
 
p  "
p   p
() "
"
(2  ())  p   p
+(1  ())p
#
 (1  ()) pp   p+ ()p  p   p
() "  p  ()p
(1  ()) + pp   
Moreover, when "  p ()p
(1 ())+ p
p
  ; one can easily check that :
HL = 
1
HL  LH
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and when "  p ()p
(1 ())+ p
p
 
HL = 
2
HL  LH
LL + LL

pR  I  HL + HL pR  I = HL + HL pR  I  HLRp
, HLRp  (1  ())

LHR

p   p   "   + +B	  ()F
, HL 
(1  ())  p  "
p
0@
h
B   ()(1 ())F
i
R

(p+ ")   p  "
1A
, HL 
(1  ())  p  "
p
LH
Since (1  ()) p  p and since HH  LH , ICLL!HL is also satised. Finally, we get
HL = max

1HL;
2
HL
	
=
8><>:
1HL if " 
p ()p
(1 ())+ p
p
  = "ib
2HL if " 
p ()p
(1 ())+ p
p
  = "ib
LL + LL

pR  I  (1  ())HH + HH  p  "R  I+B	+ () (w   F ) =
(ICLL!HH)
(1  ())HH + HH (p+ ")R  I  HHR (p+ ")    p  "+B	+ () (w   F )
, HH 
(
(1  ())LHR p   p   "   + +B	
 ()F + HLRp
)0@
h
B   ()(1 ())F
i
R

(p+ ")    p  "
1A = 1HH
HL + HL

pR  I  (1  ())HH + HH  p  "R  I+B	+ () (w   F )
(ICHL!HH)
= (1  ())
(
(1  ())w + LLRp+ LHR p   p   "   + +B	
+() (w   F ) + HLRp  HHR [p+ 2"] +B
)
+ () (w   F )
, HH 
(1  ())HLRp  ()LHR

p   p   "   + + (1  ())B   ()F
R [p+ 2"]
= 2HH
LH + LH

(p+ ")R  I  HH + HH (p+ ")R  I (ICLH!HH)
= HH + HH

(p+ ")R  I  HHR (p+ ")
, HH 
(1  ())LHR

p   p   "   + 
+HLRp
+ (1  ())B   ()F
R (p+ ")
= 3HH
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We thus have:
LL = 0
LH =
B   ()(1 ())F
R

(p+ ")   p  "
HL =
8><>:
1HL if " 
p ()p
(1 ())+ p
p
  = "ib
2HL if " 
p ()p
(1 ())+ p
p
  = "ib
HH  max

HL;
1
HH ;
2
HH ;
3
HH
	
ULL = LL + LL

pR  I = w
ULH = LH + LH

(p+ ")R  I = w + LLRp = w
UHL = HL + HL

pR  I = (1  ())( w + LLRp
+LHR

p   p   "   + +B
)
+ () (w   F )
= w + (1  ())  p  "
0@
h
B   ()(1 ())F
i


(p+ ")   p  "
1A
UHH = HH + HH

(p+ ")R  I = (1  ())( w + LLRp
+LHR

p   p   "   + +B
)
+() (w   F ) + HLRp
=
8>><>>:
w +
(p ")p()2[(1 ())B ()F ]
[p+2"][p p] if " 
p ()p
(1 ())+ p
p
  = "ib
w +
(p+")
h
B  ()
(1 ())F
i
[(p+") (p ")] if " 
p ()p
(1 ())+ p
p
  = "ib
To sum up, here are the CEO utilities when there is an Independent Board:
ULL = w
ULH = w
UHL = w + (1  ())
 
p  "
0@
h
B   ()(1 ())F
i


(p+ ")   p  "
1A
UHH =
8><>:
w +
(p ")p()2[(1 ())B ()F ]
[p+2"][p p] if "  "ib
w +
(p+")
h
B  ()
(1 ())F
i
[(p+") (p ")] if "  "ib
We can verify now that we have
ULL  ULH  UHL  UHH
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When "  "ib, we need to see if pp p  1, which is true since p p = p p. Subsequently,
we have UHL  UHH . When "  "ib, since (1  ())
 
p  "  p+ ", we also have UHL  UHH .
One can remark that types (HL) and (HH) informational rents are lower with an Independent
Board than without Board.
UHLib  UHLnb () (1  ())
 
p  "
0@
h
B   ()(1 ())F
i


(p+ ")   p  "
1A  B  p  "
 [p+ 2"]
() (1  ())

B   ()
(1  ())F

 B , which is true
Moreover, we can prove that "ib  "nb. Indeed,
"ib   "nb  0
() p  p
(1  ) + pp   
  p
 +
p
p   
 0
() 2 p   p  0
which is true since we have p  p  0.
This implies that we only have three possible cases to consider for UHH
1. When "  "ib
UHHib   UHHnb =
 
p  " p ()2 [(1  ())B   ()F ]
 [p+ 2"]

p   p   B
 
p  " p ()2
 [p+ 2"]

p   p
sign(UHHib   UHHnb) = sign( () (B + F )
 
p  " ()2)  0
2. When "ib  "  "nb
UHHib   UHHnb =
(p+ ")
h
B   ()(1 ())F
i


(p+ ")   p  "   B
 
p  " p ()2
 [p+ 2"]

p   p
sign(UHHib   UHHnb) = sign

(p+ ")

B   ()
(1  ())F
 
p   p B  p  " p
Since B 
h
B   ()(1 ())F
i
we need to prove that
 
p  " p  (p+ ")  p   p 
p  " p   (p+ ")  p   p = pp   pp + pp   "  p   p+ p
= p

p  "

   p
p
 + 

Since "  "nb, we have p  "

   pp + 

 0
3. When "ib  "nb  "
UHHib   UHHnb =
(p+ ")
h
B   ()(1 ())F
i


(p+ ")   p  "   B (p+ ") [p+ 2"]
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Since B 
h
B   ()(1 ())F
i
we have UHHib  UHHnb .
We can now calculate the income of the shareholders. There are two cases to consider. When
"  "ib,
WIB = E()  w   w0   (1  )(1  ())(p  ")
h
B   ()(1 ())F
i
(p+ 2")
"
 + (1  ) p
p   p
#
When "  "ib,
WIB = E()  w   w0   (1  )
h
B   ()(1 ())F
i
(p+ 2")

(1  ())(p  ") + (1  )(p+ ")
We have to nd for which values of  ; the contract is collusion proof.
1. "  "ib
WCP  WCF =  (1  )(1  ())(p  ")
h
B   ()(1 ())F
i
(p+ 2")
24 (1  ())
+(1   + () ) pp p
35
+(1  )
"
 + (1  ) p
p   p
#
B(p  ")
(p+ 2")
 0 for all  2 [min; 0]
with 0 =
p
p p for "  "ib: Indeed,
WCP  WCF =
(1  )(p  ")
(p+ 2")
0BBBB@

 + (1  ) p
p p

B
  [(1  ())B   ()F ]
24 (1  ())
+(1   + () ) pp p
35
1CCCCA
As, we have ()ED() = 1 ; this gives
WCP  WCF =
(1  )(p  ")
(p+ 2")
0BBBBB@

 + (1  ) p
p p

(B + F ) + B

2
 

B + F +B p
p p


+ (B + F ) p
p p
1CCCCCA
This polynomial in  with a positive second degree term has 2 positive roots. If those roots are
both lower than 0; then, WCP  WCF  0 for all  2 [min; 0] : The lowest root is
1 =


B + F +B p
p p

 
vuuuuut 
2

B + F +B p
p p
2
 4 (B + F ) p
p p

 + (1  ) p
p p

(B + F ) + B

2

 + (1  ) p
p p

(B + F ) + B

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We have
1  0
()
0BBBBBB@
4

p
p p
2 
 + (1  ) p
p p

(B + F ) + B
2
 4

B + F +B p
p p

p
p p

 + (1  ) p
p p

(B + F ) + B

 4 (B + F ) p
p p

 + (1  ) p
p p

(B + F ) + B

1CCCCCCA  0
() 4
 
p
p   p
!2 " 
 + (1  ) p
p   p
!
(B + F ) + B
#" 
 + (1  ) p
p   p
!
(B + F )
#
 0
which is true. WCP  WCF is therefore positive for all  2 [min; 0] : The optimal contract is the
collusion proof contract for "  "ib:
2. "ib  "  "nb
WCP  WCF =  (1  )
h
B   ()(1 ())F
i
(p+ 2")

(1  ())2(p  ") + (1   + ()

)(p+ ")

+(1  )
"
 + (1  ) p
p   p
#
B(p  ")
(p+ 2")
 0 for all  2 [min; 0]
with 0 =
p+"
p " + 1 if "  "ib: Indeed,
WCP  WCF = (1  )
(p+ 2")
0BBBBB@
24 
+(1  ) p
p p
35B(p  ")
+
h
B   ()(1 ())F
i " (1  ())2(p  ")
+(1   + () )(p+ ")
#
1CCCCCA
As, we have ED() = 1 ; this gives
WCP  WCF =
(1  )(p  ")
(p+ 2")(   1)
0BBBBBBBBBBB@

(1  ) p
p p   (1  )
(p+")
(p ")

B3264  

 + (1  ) p
p p

B + 2B
+

 + (1  ) (p+")(p ")

(B + F )
375 2
 
h
B

1 + (p+")(p ")

+ 2 (B + F )
i

+ (B + F )

1 + (p+")(p ")

1CCCCCCCCCCCA
We are now able to show that this degree 3 polynomial, denote it P (); is negative for all  2
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[min; 0] : Indeed
@P ()
@
=
0BBBBB@
32B(1  )

p
p p  
(p+")
(p ")

+2

 

 + (1  ) p
p p

B + 2B +

 + (1  ) (p+")(p ")

(B + F )

 
h
B

1 + (p+")(p ")

+ 2 (B + F )
i
1CCCCCA
Moreover, as
"  "ib ()

 
p(0   2
  "0
p
 1
we have
2B(1  )
"
p
p   p  
(p+ ")
(p  ")
#
= B(1  )
 
p
p   p
! 

 
p(0   2
  "0
p
!
 B(1  )
 
p
p   p
!
and thus
@P ()
@

0BBBB@
3B(1  )

p
p p

+2

 

 + (1  ) p
p p

B + 2B + (1  ) (p+")(p ") (0   1) (B + F )

  [B0 + 2 (B + F )]
1CCCCA  0
()   B0 + 2 (B + F )
 + (1  ) p
p p

B + B +

 + (1  ) (p+")(p ")

(B + F )
Moreover,
B0 + 2 (B + F )
 + (1  ) p
p p

B + B +

 + (1  ) (p+")(p ")

(B + F )
 0
Hence, @P ()@ is negative for all  2 [min; 0] : Finally, we will show that (WCP  WCF ) (0)  0
(WCP  WCF ) (0)  0()
(1  )(p  ")
(p+ 2")0
0BBBBBBB@

(1  ) p
p p   (1  )
(p+")
(p ")

B30264  

 + (1  ) p
p p

B + 2B
+

 + (1  ) (p+")(p ")

(B + F )
375 20
  [B0 + 2 (B + F )] 0 +  (B + F ) 0
1CCCCCCCA
 0
()
0B@ B(1  ) pp p0 (0   1)

p
p p  
(p+")
(p ")

+(1  )0 (0   1)F +  (0   1) (B + F )
1CA  0
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However, as
"  "nb ()
p
p   p(p  ") 
pp+

p   p p  pp
p   p   (p  ")
we have, together with p  p
p
p   p  
(p+ ")
(p  ") 
p
p   p  
(p+ ")
(p  ")
 pp+

p   p p  pp
p   p (p  ")   1  (p+ ")(p  ")  0
As

p
p p  
(p+")
(p ")

 0; (WCP  WCF ) (0) is thus positive and as @P ()@ is negative for all  2
[min; 0] ; WCP   WCF is therefore positive for all  2 [min; 0] : The optimal contract is the
collusion proof contract for "ib  "  "nb:
3. "ib  "nb  "
WCP  WCF =  (1  )
h
B   ()(1 ())F
i
(p+ 2")
"
(1  ())2(p  ")
+(1   + () )(p+ ")
#
+(1  ) [(p+ ")  (p+ 2")] B
(p+ 2")
 0 for all  2 [min; 0]
with 0 =
p+"
p " + 1 if "  "ib: Indeed,
WCP  WCF =
(1  )(p  ")
(p+ 2")
0BB@
[ + (1  ) (0   1)]B
 
h
B   ()(1 ())F
i " (1  ())2
+(1   + () ) (0   1)
# 1CCA
As, we have ED() = 1 ; this gives
WCP  WCF =
(1  )(p  ")
(p+ 2")(   1)
0BB@
[ (2B + F ) + (1  ) (0   1)F ] 2
  [B0 + 2 (B + F )] 
+ (B + F ) 0
1CCA
This polynomial in  with a positive second degree term has 2 positive roots. If those roots are
both lower than 0; then, WCP  WCF  0 for all  2 [min; 0] : The lowest root is
2 =
 [B0 + 2 (B + F )] 
vuut 2 [B0 + 2 (B + F )]2
 4 (B + F ) 0 [ (2B + F ) + (1  ) (0   1)F ]
2 [ (2B + F ) + (1  ) (0   1)F ]
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We have
2  0
() 420
"
 (2B + F )
+(1  ) (0   1)F
#2
  40 [B0 + (B + F )]
"
 (2B + F )
+(1  ) (0   1)F
#
 0
() 40 (0   1) [ (2B + F ) + (1  ) (0   1)F ] [ (B + F ) + (1  )0F ]  0
which is true. WCP  WCF is therefore positive for all  2 [min; 0] : The optimal contract is the
collusion proof contract for "ib  "nb  ":
Proof of Proposition 6. When "  b" and b  0; we have
WCB() =
8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
 
h
B   1 1F
i " (  1 )2(p  ")
+((1  ) + 
2
)(p+ ")
#
if 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 
h
B   1 1F
i24 (  1 )2
+
h
(1  ) (  1 ) +  ( 1)3
i
p
p p
35 if b    0
  1 [(   1)B   F ]

 + (1  ) p
p p

if   0
;
When "  b" or b  0; we have:
WCB() =
8>><>>:
  1
( 1)2 [(   1)B   F ]
"
 (   1)2 (p  ")
+((1  ) 2 + )(p+ ")
#
if   0
  1 [(   1)B   F ]

(   1)(p  ") + (1  )(p+ ") if   0 ;
Assume rst "  b" and b  0: As F has to be set as high as possible, we have hB   1( 1)Fi =
K; due to the CEOs limited liability constraint. We thus have, if   b
@WCB()
@
=  
 
K
"
(p  ")
 
22 (   1)  2 (   1)2
4
!
  2
3
(p+ ")
#!
=  
 
2K

(p  ") (   1)  (p+ ")
3
!
However,
(p  ") (   1)  (p+ ")  0
as   0 = 1 + (p+")(p ") : And then @WCB()@  0:
If b    0;
WCB() =  K
24 (  1 )2
+
h
(1  ) (  1 ) +  ( 1)3
i
p
p p
35
35
The rst derivative of this objective function is in this case:
@WCB()
@
=  
 
K
"


2 (   1)
3

+

(1  )
2
+ 
3  2
4

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p   p
#!
=  K
4

2 (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2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0

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4

22   2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20 + 30   2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
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
2
2
  2
3
+
(1  ) 0
2
+
30
4
  20
3

=
K
4
 2 (2 + (1  ) 0) + 2 (1 + 0)  30
The sign of this expression is equivalent to the sign of a second degree concave polynomial in  :
This polynomial has two positive roots. We will show below that it is negative in b and 0 and
that its derivative in b and 0 is also negative. This implies that it is negative for all  in [b ; 0]
and that consequently WCB() is non increasing on this interval. Indeed, we have
@WCB()
@
j0 =  K
40

(1  ) 30 + 0
  0
=  K

(1  )
0
+

30

 0
and
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)
@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 =  Kb2
26666642
0B@1  10
0  (p+")(p ")
1CA+ (1  ) 0 + 30 
0
0  (p+")(p ")
!2   20 
0
0  (p+")(p ")
!
3777775
=  Kb2
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2
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(p ")
0
!
+ (1  ) 0
+
3

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2
0
  2

0   (p+")(p ")

37775
=
Kb2
"
 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0
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(p  ")   2

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
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
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This is always negative as  = 162

(p+")
(p ")
2   4 (p+")(p ") 2 + 3 (p+")(p ")  0 because   12 :
Moreover, it is easy to check that the derivative of the second degree concave polynomial in 
(having the same sign as @WCB()@ ) is negative in 0 and in b (because   12): This implies that
@WCB()
@
 0 for all  2 [b ; 0] :
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If   0;
@WCB()
@
=  (   1)

K
"
 + (1  ) p
p   p
#
=   1
2
K
"
 + (1  ) p
p   p
#
 0
When "  b"; or b  0 we have, if   0
@WCB()
@
=  

K
2
3

(   1) (p  ")  (p+ ")  0
If   0
WCB() =  K


(   1)2

(p  ") + (1  )   1
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
@WCB()
@
=  K


2(   1)  (   1)2
2
(p  ") + (1  ) 1
2
(p+ ")

=  K

(   1) + 1
2
(p  ") + (1  ) 1
2
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
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This allows us to conclude that when "  b" and 0  b ; it is optimal for the shareholders to
select a Board of Directors with a low degree of independence, i.e.  = b . In all other cases, it is
optimal for the shareholders to select a Board of Directors with a high degree of independence, i.e.
 = 0.
References
[1] Adams R. B, Ferreira D, 2007, A theory of friendly boards,Journal of Finance 62, 217-250.
[2] Adams, R.B., B.E. Hermalin and M.S. Weisbach, 2010, The role of boards of directors in
corporate governance: A conceptual framework and survey,Journal of Economic Literature
48, 58-107.
[3] Bebchuk, L. and M.S. Weisbach, 2010, The State of Corporate Governance Research,Review
of Financial Studies 23, 939-961.
[4] Boone, A. L, Field L.C, Karpo¤ J.M, Raheja C.G, 2007, The Determinants of Corporate
Board Size and Independence: An Empirical Analysis, Journal of Financial Economics 85,
65-101.
37
[5] Cespa G. and G. Cestone, 2007, Corporate Social Responsibility and Managerial Entrench-
ment,Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 16, 741-771.
[6] Chhaochharia, V. and Y. Grinstein, 2009, CEO Compensation and Board Structure,The
Journal of Finance 64, 231-261.
[7] Cornelli F., Z. Kominek and A. Ljungqvist, 2010, "Monitoring Managers: Does it Matter?"
Working Paper, NYU.
[8] Core, J., R. Holthausen and D. Larcker, 1999, Corporate Governance, Chief Executive O¢ cer
Compensation, and Firm Performance,Journal of Financial Economics 51, 371-406.
[9] Dahya, J. and J. McConnell, 2007, Board Composition, Corporate Performance, and the
Cadbury Committee Recommendation, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 42,
535-564.
[10] Faure-Grimaud, A., La¤ont, J.-J. and D. Martimort, 2003, Collusion, Delegation, and Super-
vision with Soft Information,Review of Economic Studies 70, 253-279.
[11] Harris M., and A. Raviv, 2006, A theory of board control and size, Review of Financial
Studies 21, 1797-832.
[12] Hermalin, B.E., 2005, Trends in Corporate Governance,The Journal of Finance 60, 2351
2384.
[13] Hermalin, B.E, and M.S. Weisbach, 1998, Endogenously chosen boards of directors and their
monitoring of the CEO,American Economic Review 88, 96-118.
[14] Hermalin, B.E. and M.S. Weisbach, 2003, Boards of Directors as an Endogenously Determined
Institution: A Survey of the Economic Literature,FRBNY Economic Policy Review 9, 7-26.
[15] Linck, J.S., J.M. Netter and T. Yang, 2008, The Determinants of Board Structure,Journal
of Financial Economics 87, 308-328..
[16] Raheja, C. G, 2005, Determinants of board size and composition: A theory of corporate
boards,Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 40, 283-306 .
[17] Schleifer, A. and R. Vishny, (1997), A Survey of Corporate Governance, The Journal of
Finance 2, 737-783.
[18] Tirole, J., 1986, Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations,
Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 2, 181-214.
38
[19] Tirole J., 2001, Corporate Governance,Econometrica 69, 1-35.
[20] Yano, T., (2006), An Optimal Board System: Supervisory Board vs. Management Board,
Working Paper, University of Tokyo.
39
